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Introduction
In his paper for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Krugman (1995) identifies several new aspects of modern world trade. One of them is the ability of producers to "slice up the value chain," breaking the production process into many geographically separated steps. This phenomenon is commonly known as "foreign outsourcing" and it is the outcome of globalization of the world economy in the last two decades, as surveyed in Feenstra (1998) . What are the economic consequences of this new development? The dominant discussion topic related to this question by academics and commentators alike has been the domestic impact of foreign outsourcing, particularly its impact on employment and wages in industrialized countries, for example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , Feenstra, Hanson and Swenson (1999), Harrigan (1999) , Head and Ries (1999) , Kapstein (1996) , Kletzer (1999) , and Rodrik (1997) . However, the global implications of foreign outsourcing for trade policies have been ignored, such as in the debate on China's most favored nation (MFN) trading status in the US.
The hotly debated MFN issue has motivated many discussions on the consequences of revoking China's MFN. Much of the concern has focused on two damaging effects on the US: (1). US consumers' welfare loss due to higher import price; and (2). the denial of the US access to Chinese market if China retaliates with tariff on the US goods (e.g., Arce and Taylor 1997 , IBERC 1996 , and World Bank 1994 . Although there is an implication in the discussion that the aggressive commercial presence of European Union, Japan and the Asian NIEs in China will make the situation worse for the US in global competition in case of revoking China's MFN, it is largely based on the assumption that China will retaliate. Foreign outsourcing does not come into play in these studies. By theoretically formalizing the effect of the US trade policy towards China in the presence of a competitor, however, this paper will examine another channel through which the US will suffer from revoking China's MFN, even if China does not retaliate: outsourcing through trade.
Specifically, we speculate that, if the US increases the tariff on its imports from China, it will not only increase the US domestic price of labor-intensive consumer goods imported from China, but also increase the domestic price of intermediate inputs for the high-tech goods in the US and increase their production cost. On the other hand, it will lower the import price of intermediate inputs for EU, Japan and the NIEs, and thus help reduce production cost of high-tech goods in these countries. Therefore, the US tariff on Chinese goods forces Chinese economy to integrate with the economies of the EU, Japan and the NIEs, and to disintegrate from the US economy. The EU, Japan and the NIEs will enjoy more benefit from trade with China, especially the cheaper Chinese intermediate inputs. This suggests an indirect effect of the US tariff on competition in high-tech products, which might be an improved competitiveness for the EU, Japan and the NIEs and the declined competitiveness for the US. As a result, the share of the US high-tech sector in the world market will decline and the share of its competitors will increase. With the decline of market share of the US high-tech sector, the profit in this sector may also decline, which may lead to a welfare loss for the US.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a background discussion on the MFN issue and the role of foreign outsourcing in forming China's trade patterns with industrialized countries. In section 3, as a benchmark, a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model with three countries and three goods is developed. The effects of the US trade sanctions against China on prices, outputs and welfare are examined. In section 4, the analysis is extended to incorporate imperfect competition in high-tech sector. Section 5 concludes.
at least in theory. In order to understand the prospect of the MFN issue, one has to understand the role of the bilateral trade in the overall US-China relations, the underlying motives of the MFN debate, and related clauses in international trade law.
The annual MFN debate has never meant to be a serious policy deliberation, despite high tensions around this issue in years after the Tiananmen crackdown. Due to deeply rooted mutual ideological and political hostility, the relationship between the two countries has never been smooth, especially after the Cold War. Today, the only major area in which the two countries have a common interest is trade, rather than geo-politics as in the Cold War era. But even this trade relation is hardly harmonious, as evidenced by the ballooning US trade deficit with China 2 . The irreconcilable political and ideological difference and the imbalanced trade relation put the two countries on a collision course, and as such, bilateral trade, the supporting pillar of the fragile overall US-China relation, is bound to be caught in a crossfire. In the US, human rights advocates, religious conservatives and other China critics believe MFN is the only potentially effective leverage to influence the behavior of Chinese government; and the MFN renewal has become a forum for the debate of a wide range of issues concerning the US-China relations, such as human rights, weapon proliferation, campaign contributions and more recently, nuclear espionage.
Therefore, the MFN debate is not an economic issue per se, and much less about emigration; it is about politics 3 . Given the cynicism of the debate, The Los Angeles Times calls denying China's MFN "a most farcical notion" (Mann 1999 
A Perfectly Competitive Model: A Benchmark
We start with a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model with three countries and three goods. The consequences of the US sanctions against China are examined under this framework. Particularly, we investigate the effects of the trade conflict on prices, output and welfare. The model setup and results in this section serve as the basis for an extended analysis in section 4.
The Model Setup
We assume that there are three countries: country A represents the US, country Good 1 is capital and R&D-intensive relative to both goods 2 and 3; good 2 is capital intensive relative to good 3 and labor-intensive relative to good 1; good 3 is labor intensive relative to both goods 1 and 2. Both countries A and B produce goods 1 and good 2 and country C produces goods 2 and good 3. Trade occurs only between countries A and C, and between countries B and C. By Heckscher--Ohlin theorem, countries A and B export good 1 to country C and import goods 2 and 3 from country C.
We assume constant-return-to-scale (CRS) production functions 7 , ) , , (
Notice that the intermediate input (y 2 ) is used in the production of high-tech goods (y 1 ), but not in low-tech consumer goods (y 3 ).
In a perfectly competitive economy, given the prices of the products, each country maximizes its GNP, subject to resource constraints. Solutions to the GNP- 
Since only goods 1 and 3 are final goods and enter the utility function, the compensated demand functions for goods 1 and 3 can be derived by solving an expenditure minimization problem, subject to a certain level of utility, and taking the prices of good 1 and good 3 as given,
(3-1)
where i = 1, 3 and j = a, b, c.
The net export functions for country A and B are,
where j = a, b.
The net export functions for country C are, 
Combining the comparative static results from GNP-maximization and expenditure-minimization problems, we can find properties for the net export functions as listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
The model is completed by setting up the equilibrium conditions as shown below, which consist of two market clearing conditions for each of goods 1 and 3
(equations 3-2 and 3-3) and three balance of trade conditions for each of countries A, B and C (equations 3-4, 3-5 and 3-6). By Walras' Law, the market clearing condition for good 2 holds if it holds for good 1 and 3. can be finally determined. This is the basic benchmark analytical framework.
Tariff Effects
Given the model setup in 3.1, we now illustrate the consequences of revoking China's MFN. Particularly, we examine the effects of tariff on the price, output and welfare.
Suppose country A imposes a uniform ad valorem tariff t on its imports of both good 2 and good 3 from country C, and rebates the tariff revenue back to consumers. With the tariff, country A's domestic price for goods 2 and 3
Let good 2 --the intermediate input --be the numeraire ( p 2 1 = ), the new equilibrium conditions become, To derive the comparative static results, differentiate the above equations with respect to t. We follow the similar technical treatment as in Feenstra (1986) , applying Tables 2 and 3) , and evaluating at t = 0,
x dp dt dp dt du dt du dt du dt 
The first two equations give,
x dp dt dp dt 
The last three equations give,
After canceling the terms of income effect, we have,
, then dp dt dp dt 
Before proceeding to analyze the tariff effects, we assume that utility functions take the form of Leontief type, that is, indifference curves are L-shaped, as shown in Figure 1 . As a result, there is a fixed proportion in demand between good 1 and good 3 and consumers' choice of good 1 or good 3 is independent of the relative price of good 1 and good 3, at given utility level. In other words, the compensated demand curves for good 1 and good 3 are vertical 9 . By so doing, we assumes away the substitution effect (but not the income effect) from demand side so that we can simplify the analysis and focus on the effect of tariff on the production side. Table 4 gives the properties of net export functions with L-shaped indifference curves. 8 Generally, for local Walrasian stability the eigenvalue of Z must be positive in their real parts. Then Z , which equals the product of the eigenvalues, is positive. In the proofs of the following propositions, this paper shows the sign of Z in each case as a confirmation. Proposition (1a) is illustrated in Figure 2 . With the assumption of Leontief utility function, the aggregate demand curve for good 1 stands vertical, and the change in relative price between good 1 and good 3 does not shift the curve, but the change in welfare does. Since the net effect of welfare change on the world demand for good 1 is zero 11 , the world demand curve for good 1 in Figure 2 remains unchanged throughout the discussion. The change in relative price of good 1 comes only from the supply side. An immediate effect of the tariff is an increase in country A's domestic prices of goods 2 and 3. Since good 3 is a final consumer good rather than the input into production of good 1, the rise in its price in country A has no effect on the supply of good 1. The increase in domestic price of good 2, however, causes the decline in country A's supply of good 1, that is, the shift of country A's supply curve of good 1 to the left. With good 2 in world market as numeraire, country B's supply curve of good 1 remains unchanged. Therefore, there is a reduction in aggregate supply of good 1, which is shown in Figure 2 as a leftward shift of the aggregate supply curve. As a result, the price of good 1 in world market increases.
The intuition behind Proposition (1b) is that the tariff has zero effect on either demand or supply side of good 3. In the supply side, the world supply function of good 3 is country C's production function of good 3, c  c  c  c  3  3  2  3  3  3   1  =  =  ( , , ) ( , , ) . Since none of the arguments other than p 3 in the production function is affected by the tariff, the supply curve in the p 3 -y c 3 space remains unchanged. In the demand side, the assumption of L-shaped indifference curve rules out any reaction from consumers to the change in relative price between good 1 and good 3, and the compensated demand curve for good 3 in the p 3 -y c 3 space also remains unchanged. Thus, the equilibrium price of good 3 does not change.
While Proposition (1a) shows that the tariff raises the price of good 1 relative to world price of good 2, which is the numeraire, Proposition (1c) indicates that the price of good 1 relative to country A's domestic price of good 2, which is (1+t), declines. This is because the tariff raises the price of good 2 by a factor t and in order for country A to keep the same output level of good 1, the price of good 1 has to be also raised by the same factor t, which will increase the relative price of good 1 in the world market. In response to the higher price, country B will increase production and put the downward pressure on the price. At equilibrium, the increase in price of good 1 is smaller than a factor t. As shown in Figure 5 , the tariff raises country A's domestic price of good 2 relative to the world price of good 2 by a factor t, and country A's supply curve for good 1 shifts upward by a distance of tp 1 . Given that the total demand for good 1 is fixed and country B's supply curve does not change as a result of tariff, the new world equilibrium price of good 1 increases by less than tp 1 . Therefore, in country A, the price of good 1 relative to domestic price of good 2 declines. Since the relative price between good 1 and good 2 in country A declines, at the same time when it imports less good 2, resources are moved away from production of good 1 to the production of good 2. Thus, country A's output of good 1 declines.
The Output Effect: Proposition 2 (2a).Country A's import of good 2 declines and country B's import of good
The opposite happens to country B. This scenario can also be illustrated in Figure 5 , which shows that given the total demand/output of good 1 fixed, the amount of reduction in output of good 1 in country A equals the amount of increase in the output of good 1 in country B. Country A's market share is taken by country B.
The relative price between good 2 and good 3 does not change, therefore, country C's outputs of good 2 and 3 remain fixed. Recall Proposition (3a) and (3b) that tariff increases the price of good 1 and has no effect on the price of good 3. This implies the terms of trade gains for both country A and country B since both of them import good 3 and export good 1, and terms of trade loss for country C since it imports good 1 and export good 3. This scenario is made possible when sector 1 is imperfectly competitive as it has always been. To be more realistic, the next section will include into the model the imperfect competition in sector 1 and show the role the profits play in the welfare determination.
An Imperfectly Competitive Model
The previous perfectly competitive model gives the conventional tariff effect on a large country's welfare. A large country will gain from the tariff on its import through terms of trade improvement. However, we speculate that in an imperfectly competitive market for good 1, country A's import tariff may adversely affects its welfare. This is because the tariff on intermediate input (good 2) may increase the price of good 2 in country A and reduce country A's output of good 1, and thus reduce its export of good 1. The decline of country A's output of good 1 may reduce its profit. As a result, the welfare in country A may decline.
In this section, we modify the previous model, assuming imperfect competition in sector 1. First, we give the firms' profit maximization problem in a Cournot-Nash setting. This serves as the conceptual foundation of the modeling. Then, the equivalent GNP-maximization problem is given to help derive the comparative static properties of countries export functions. Following the same procedure as earlier, the model will show that the tariff has effects not only on countries terms of trade and resource allocations, but also on the profit in sector 1. Country A's welfare can be worsen by the tariff even without retaliation from its trading partner.
Firm's Profit Maximization Problem
We assume that market for good 1 is imperfectly competitive and markets for both good 2 and 3 are still perfectly competitive. In sector 1, given output of the other firms, an individual firm chooses its own output to maximize the profits. In the world market, the number of firms in sector 1 is finite and the output change of any firm can affect the world price, ceteris paribus. In each country, the number of firms is fixed, and firms are symmetric.
In country j ( j = A, B), firm i in sector 1 solves the following problem, 
A Hypothetical IPC-compatible GNP Maximization Problem
In a two-sector competitive economy, the individual firm's profit maximization behavior leads to GNP maximization for the whole economy in the absence of any distortions. This is how the invisible hand works. But this is not the case in an imperfectly competitive economy. In the imperfectly competitive economy described above, where firms in sector 1 play a Cournot game, the equivalent GNP maximization problem is, These properties of the GNP-max problem will help derive the properties of the export functions next.
Export Functions under Imperfect Competition
The assumption of IPC in good 1 market implies that the producers charge Table 2 ). 
Tariff Effects
With tariff on country A's import of good 2 and 3, and good 2 as numeraire Total differentiation gives, (Tables 2   and 3 ) to the RHS of the equation, and evaluating at t = 0, the above equation system is simplified as
x dp dt dp dt The first two equations give,
x x x x x dp dt dp dt 
x dp dt dp dt Substituting (4-7) into (4-6), Z dp dt dp dt The intuition behind Proposition (4a) is pretty much the same as that for Proposition (1a), except that the aggregate demand curve for good 1 shifts to the left --as a result of world welfare decline, which will be discussed later --and therefore holds down a little bit the rise of the price of good 1, as shown in Figure 3 . Similarly, for Proposition (4b), because the leftward shift of the aggregate demand curve for good 3 and the supply curve remain unchanged, the price for good 3 declines as shown in Figure 4 .
Proposition (4c) gives the same conclusion on country A's domestic relative price change as in PC case (Proposition (1c)). But there is a difference: under IPC, the tariff reduces the total demand for (and therefore total output of) good 1, as shown in Figure 6 , which adds another downward pressure on the price of good 1. This makes the rise of the good 1 price even less than a factor t and causes more decline in the domestic relative price between good 1 and good 2.
12 Only Propositions (4b), (5d) and (6c), and the country C's output effect in Proposition (5b) and the welfare effects for countries B and C in Proposition (6b), however, depend on the assumptions of L- 
Section Summary
This section modifies the three countries and three goods general equilibrium > 0.
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